Zion\u27s First National Bank and 4447 Associates, a Utah General Partnership, by and through its General Partner, Robert D. Kent v. Overthrust Oil and Gas Corporation, a Utah Corporation, Bertagnole Investment Company Limited Partnership, a Utah Limited Partnership, Faust Land, Inc., a Utah Corporation, Joseph L. Pentz, Capitol Thrift and Loan, Richard A. Christenson; Overthrust Oil and Gas Corporation, a Utah Corporation, and Faust Land, Inc., a Utah Corporation v. Capitol Thrift and Loan, a Utah Corporation, and Richard A. Christenson, an individual: Unknown by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
Zion's First National Bank and 4447 Associates, a
Utah General Partnership, by and through its
General Partner, Robert D. Kent v. Overthrust Oil
and Gas Corporation, a Utah Corporation,
Bertagnole Investment Company Limited
Partnership, a Utah Limited Partnership, Faust
Land, Inc., a Utah Corporation, Joseph L. Pentz,
Capitol Thrift and Loan, Richard A. Christenson;
Overthrust Oil and Gas Corporation, a Utah
Corporation, and Faust Land, Inc., a Utah
Corporation v. Capitol Thrift and Loan, a Utah
Corporation, and Richard A. Christenson, an
individual: Unknown
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lorin N. Pace; Attorneys for Faust LAnd and Overthrust Oil and Gas Corp., Defendants and Cross
Claim Plaintiffs;
R. Stephen Marshall; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall, and McCarthy; Attorney for defendants Richard
A. Christenson and Capital Thrift and Loan, Defendants and Cross-Claim Defendants; Bruce J.
Nelson; Allen, Nelson, Hardy and Evans; Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Cross-Claim Respondents.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Zions First National Bank v. Overthrust Oil and Gas Corporation, No. 90391.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2807
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
45.9 
IS9 
POCKET NO.' 
CRiEF 
dsM. THE SUPREME COURT OP "THE STATE OP UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK and 
4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah General 
Partnership, by and through its 
General Partner, ROBERT D. KENT, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation; BERTAGNOLE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED PART-
NERSHIP, a Utah Limited Partner-
nership; FAUST LAND, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; JOSEPH L. PENTZ; 
CAPITOL THRIFT & LOAN; RICHARD A. 
CHRISTENSON, 
Defendants 
BRIEF ON APPEAL OF 
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPOR-
ATION AND FAUST LAND, INC. 
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
(Subject to Assignment to 
the Court of Appeals) 
Appeal No. 90 391 
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, and FAUST 
LAND/ INC. a Utah Corporation, 
Cross Claim Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
vs. 
CAPITOL THRIFT & LOAN, a Utah 
Corporation, and RICHARD A. 
CHRISTENSON, an individual, 
Cross Claim Defendants 
and Respondents 
Bruce J- Nelson, Esq. 
ALLEN, NELSON, HARDY & EVANS 
215 Sowtiv St^ -te Street, #SQO 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Cross-Claim Respondents 
Jjorin N. Pace, Esq. 
beneficial Life Tower, #1200 
S^lt lAke Cite? , Utafo £4111 
Attorney for FAUST LAND and 
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORP., 
Defendants and Cross Claim 
plaintiffs 
R. Stephen Marshall, Esq. 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main, #1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Defendants RICHARD A. 
CHRISTENSON and CAPITOL THRIFT & LOAN, 
Defendants and Cross-Claim Defendants 
NOV 1 3 1990 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK and 
4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah General 
Partnership, by and through its 
General Partner, ROBERT D. KENT, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation; BERTAGNOLE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED PART-
NERSHIP, a Utah Limited Partner-
nership; FAUST LAND, INC., a Utah 
Corporation/ JOSEPH L. PENTZ; 
CAPITOL THRIFT & LOAN; RICHARD A. 
CHRISTENSON, 
Defendants 
BRIEF ON APPEAL OF 
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPOR-
ATION AND FAUST LAND, INC. 
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
(Subject to Assignment to 
the Court of Appeals) 
Appeal No. 90 391 
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, and FAUST 
LAND, INC. a Utah Corporation, 
Cross Claim Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
vs. 
CAPITOL THRIFT & LOAN, a Utah 
Corporation, and RICHARD A. 
CHRISTENSON, an individual, 
Cross Claim Defendants 
and Respondents 
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq. 
ALLEN, NELSON, HARDY & EVANS 
215 South State Street, #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Cross-Claim Respondents 
Lorin N. Pace, Esq. 
Beneficial Life Tower, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for FAUST LAND and 
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORP., 
Defendants and Cross Claim 
Plaintiffs 
R. Stephen Marshall, Esq. 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main, #1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Defendants RICHARD A. 
CHRISTENSON and CAPITOL THRIFT & LOAN, 
Defendants and Cross-Claim Defendants 
TABLE OP CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 3 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 3 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 3 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 4 
RELIEF REQUESTED ON APPEAL 5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 19 
ARGUMENT 2 0 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF THE AGREE-
MENT OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1987, WHICH HAD DISPOSED OF ALL ISSUES 
IN THIS CASE. 
POINT II 25 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE CASE FOR FAIL-
URE TO COMPLY WITH THE ONE ACTION RULE. U.C.A. AND PLAINTIFFS 
SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM PROCEEDING WITH THE FORECLOSURE 
ACTION AFTER HAVING DISPOSED OF OVERTHRUST'S 
PRIOR SECURITY. 
POINT III 28 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE DEBT WAS PAID BY 
AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WITH THE CONTRACTUAL RELEASE OF 
CAPITOL AND CHRISTENSON. 
POINT IV 28 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT ALL NOTES WERE PAID 
IN FULL BY TRANSFERS MADE UNDER THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT OF 
SEPTEMBER 30, 1987. 
POINT V 28 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VALUE OF STOCK GIVEN TO 
ZIONS-4447 WAS $250,000 INSTEAD OF $1,000,000. 
POINT VI - 31 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT BERTAGNOLE PARTNERSHIP AND 
MEMBERS OF THE BERTAGNOLE FAMILY HELD SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST 
IN CAPITOL THRIFT AND LOAN. (Finding No. 7) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (con't) 
POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 2 WHICH STATED 31 
"FAILURE OF THE PLAINTIFFS TO BE ALLOWED TO FORECLOSE 
AGAINST THE TOOELE PROPERTY . . . WOULD HAVE CONSTITUTED 
A FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION." (Conclusion No. 2, R-427) 
POINT VIII 32 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT OVERTHRUST WAS NOT AN 
ACCOMMODATION GUARANTOR WITH RESPECT TO THE PLEDGE OF REAL 
PROPERTY. THE COURT FURTHER ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE 
ACCOMMODATION SECURITY DISCHARGED BY THE DISCHARGE OF THE 
PRINCIPALS. 
POINT IX 35 
THE MODIFICATIONS SET FORTH IN PART III ABOVE CONSTITUTE A 
NOVATION OR A SUBSTITUTE CONTRACT. THE NOVATION COMPROMISES 
THE RIGHTS OF OVERTHRUST. 
CONCLUSION 37 
TABLE OP AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Statutes Cited 
Utah Code Annotated 78-37-1 
70A-3-606 22 
34 
37 
Legal Commentaries 55 Am Jur 2d, 437 35 
34 ALR, 980 35 
Cases Cited 
Blumfield Agency v. Little Belt. Inc., 663 P.2d 1164 (Montana) 3 
24 
Crieve v. Huber, S.C. Wyoming 283 P. 1105, 285 WY 788 35 
Horman v. Gordon. (Utah Ct of Appeals) 740 P.2d 1436 36 
McAllister v. Farmers Development. 143 P.2d 537, 47 NM 395 34 
MCIC Financial Corp. v. H.A. Briggs. 600 P.2d 573 (Wash Ct 
of Appeals 36 
Moonev v. G.R. and Associates. 746 P.2d 154 (Supreme Ct 1987) 33 
Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler. 144 P.2d 276, 105 Ut 529 3 
26 
Triste v. Industrial Commission. 544 P.2d 706, 25 Ariz 
App. 489 25 
Utah Farm Products Credit Assn. v. Watts. 737 P.2d 154, 
160 Ut 187 32 
33 
Walker v. Community Bank. 518 P.2d 321, 111 CC Rptr 897, 
10 C.3rd 729 28 
2 
STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction and 
this Appeal which is brought as a matter of right pursuant to 78-
2-2(F), and also brought pursuant to Article VIII(3) Utah State 
Constitution. 
This case is subject to assignment to Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether a party can foreclose a Trust Deed when the 
exclusive remedy by contract is one of contract rescission. 
Legal standard is one of contract interpretation. 
Blumfield Agency v. Little Belt, Inc. 663 P.2d 1164 (Montana) 
Whether the One Action rule applies to the sale of Trust 
Deed property by means of a mortgage foreclosure. 
The standard is provided by the statute 78-37-1 and Stewart 
Livestock v. Ostler, 105 V. 529, 144 P. 2276. 
There are remaining issues of fact. 
The standard is that if there was evidence in support of a 
Finding, the Finding will not be disturbed. 
If there is no evidence to support the fact, the Finding is 
subject to review. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Defendant-Appellant, OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPORATION, 
signed a Trust Deed describing certain real property located in 
Tooele County, Utah to secure payment of a Renewal Promissory 
Note with a face amount of $1,000,000.00. Said Note was signed 
by CAPITOL THRIFT AND LOAN, as maker and RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON, 
as a personal guarantor. The Note was payable to Plaintiff-
Respondent, ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK. The Note was not paid by 
CAPITOL or CHRISTENSON who had received the funds, and an action 
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was brought against OVERTHRUST to foreclose the Trust Deed as a 
mortgage. Overthrust signed the Trust Deed as a security accom-
modation and received no benefit therefrom. Overthrust did not 
sign the Note, either as a guarantor or as maker. 
Capitol and Christenson, as well as others (excluding Over-
thrust) , had executed two other Notes of large denominations 
which were also in default and had entered into a written agree-
ment with all Defendants (excluding Overthrust) to settle all 
issues. 
The Plaintiffs had accepted payments and assets to be 
credited on the Notes; had entered into subsequent agreements 
with Defendants (excluding Overthrust); had dismissed primary 
obligors (CAPITOL) and guarantor (CHRISTENSON); had applied 
assets and security erroneously to other Notes; all of which the 
Defendants-Appellants allege as defenses to the foreclosure of 
their property under the Trust Deed. 
Overthrust filed a Cross-Complaint against Capitol as maker 
of the Note and against Christenson as guarantor. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried before the District Court, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants were entered by the 
Lower Court. Judgment was granted in favor of Overthrust against 
Capitol on Overthrust!s Cross Complaint. A Judgment of Dismissal 
was entered in favor of Christenson and against Overthrust, 
dismissing Overthrustfs Cross Complaint against Christenson. 
4 
RELIEF REQUESTED ON APPEAL 
Defendants Appellants seek to have the Facts, Conclusions 
and Decree modified to be consistent with evidence and the Law. 
Defendants-Appellants also seek: 
(a) To have the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure set 
aside and the title of the land quieted in OVERTHRUST-FAUST, and 
the foreclosure action dismissed for the reasons that: 
(i) that by Contract-Agreement of September 30, 
1987, the dismissal of Maker (Capitol) and Guarantor 
(Christenson) by operation of law dismisses the Trust 
Deed upon which this action is brought; 
(ii) that the Agreement provides an exclusive 
remedy of rescission and that remedy has not been 
sought; 
(iii) that Plaintiffs are precluded from going 
around the four corners of the Agreement to foreclose 
on the Trust Deed, 
(b) To receive compensation for mineral rights con-
veyed to ZIONS-4447 ASSOCIATES; 
(c) For an Order requiring that Zions-4447 return the 
Tooele Property (Value 410,000) and North Park mineral rights 
(Value $450,000), or in the alternative for Judgment in the 
amount of $860,000, plus interest. 
(d) For subrogation judgment against Capitol and 
against Christenson for losses sustained in payment of the Note 
which was for the benefit of Capitol and Christenson. 
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(e) As an alternative, to set aside the Decree of 
Foreclosure until the resolution of the ZIONS-4447 ASSOCIATES vs. 
First Security Financial lawsuit. 
(f) For a finding that Zions-4447 accepted and con-
verted specific security pledged to secure the Note in lieu of 
payment by which Overthrust is entitled to a dismissal of the 
Complaint. 
(g) For a finding that the Note was paid in full by 
the properties and equities accepted by Zions-4447 as set forth 
in the September 30, 1987 Agreement (D-4). 
(h) For a finding that Overthrust's involvement in the 
Note was a pure accommodation and that Overthrust is entitled not 
only to Judgment against Capitol as maker, but against Christen-
son for any losses suffered by Overthrust. 
STATEMENT OP FACTS 
1. Parties 
(a) Plaintiffs are ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK and 4447 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah General Partnership, by General Partner, 
ROBERT D. KENT. These parties shall be referred to herein as 
Plaintiffs-Respondents or Zions-4447 (R-33). 
(b) Defendant is OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPORATION, a 
Utah Public Corporation, doing business in the State of Utah. 
FAUST LAND, INC. is a wholly owned subsidiary of OVERTHRUST. For 
purposes of this appeal, these Defendants shall be referred to as 
Overthrust or Overthrust-Faust (R-33 and Transcript Page 189 
Transcript Page 5). Where the name Overthrust is used it also is 
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meant to include Faust Land, Inc., where appropriate* Defendant 
Faust's only involvement in the lawsuit is that Faust held 
(holds) title to the 3500 acres sought to be foreclosed. 
(c) Bertagnole Investment Company Limited Partnership 
is (was) a Utah Partnership which filed a petition in bankruptcy 
(Transcript Page 5). Because of the bankruptcy, Bertagnole 
Investment Company is not a party to this action. However, some 
of its acts affect other parties (Exhibit D-4). This Defendant 
is known in this appeal as Bertagnole. 
(d) Joseph L. Pent was a Lessee of the property sought 
to be foreclosed. The lease expired prior to the trial of the 
case. The interest of Pent was terminated when the lease 
expired. All parties have stipulated that Pent has no interest 
in the property (Transcript R-481, Page 5). 
(e) Defendant CAPTIOL THRIFT AND LOAN is a Utah 
Industrial Loan Corporation. Capitol Thrift and Loan was the 
maker and signator of the Note secured by the Trust Deed of 
Overthrust. Capitol Thrift and Loan was and is controlled by 
Defendant Richard A. Christenson. Captiol Thrift and Loan is 
sometimes known as Capitol in this appeal (D-3, Page 1). 
(f) Richard A. Christenson is an individual residing 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. He is a former officer and 
director of Capitol. Christenson was a guarantor on the Note 
secured by the Overthrust Trust Deed. Defendant Richard A. 
Christenson is sometimes referred to as Christenson in this 
appeal. 
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2. In early 1981, Zions First National Bank advanced the 
first of a series of large loans, principally arranged through 
Christenson (Testimony of Richard A. Christenson; Testimony of 
Al Potts, Defendant, for the benefit of Richard A. Christenson, 
Capitol Thrift and Loan and for affiliates of Bertagnole Prop-
erties, a Utah Partnership (R-481, Page 223; also Exhibit D-3). 
3. The first loan advanced by Plaintiff Zions First 
National Bank was made on September 30, 1981 as a $2,00,000 
revolving line of credit to Capitol Thrift and Loan then owned by 
Richard A. Christenson (D-3, R-481, Page 223). Richard A. 
Christenson had drawn and used $870,000 of this loan as of 
September 28, 1984 (R-481, Page 225, lines 1-6). Defendant 
Overthrust received none of the proceeds of the loan (R-481, Page 
36). (Also see Page 12 of Pre-Loan Agreement [D-3] signed by 
Richard Christenson.) 
4. The second loan advanced by Plaintiff Zions First 
National Bank was made on March 13, 1983, in the amount of 
$3,015,000 to Defendant Bertagnole Investment Company Limited 
Partnership, Defendant Richard A. Christenson, an entity owned by 
Richard A. Christenson known as Franklin Financial, and a Utah 
Limited Partnership known as Bertagnole Properties (Plaintiff's 
Complaint) (Exhibit D-4, Page 1.) $2,000,000 of this second loan 
was for the benefit of and used by Richard A. Christensonfs 
entity Franklin Financial. (R-481, Page 7, Testimony of Richard 
A. Christenson.) Defendants Overthrust and Faust Land received 
none of the proceeds of this second loan (D-4, Page 2). 
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5. The third loan advanced by Plaintiff Zions First 
National Bank was made on June 8, 1984, in the amount of 
$1,389,418.76, to Defendant Bertagnole Investment Company Limited 
Partnership, and a Utah Limited Partnership known as Bertagnole 
Properties. (Plaintiff's Complaint.) Defendants Overthrust and 
Faust Land received none of the proceeds of this loan. (Exhibit 
D-4, Page 2.) 
6. The first line of credit loan was replaced by a fourth 
loan, which is the subject of this action. The fourth loan was 
made by Plaintiff Zions First National Bank on September 28, 1984 
to Defendant Capitol Thrift & Loan in the amount of $1,000,000.00 
(Plaintifffs Exhibit 1). Such loan was a renewal or rollover of 
the prior first loan to Defendant Capitol Thrift and Loan 
(Finding No. 4, R-481, Page 43) which was owed by Richard A. 
Christenson at the time the first loan was made and of which 
Capitol, under the direction of its president, Richard A. 
Christenson, had used $870,000.00 at the time the 4th loan was 
signed. (Defendants Exhibit 12; Defendants Exhibit 13; Defen-
dants Exhibit 3; Defendants Exhibit 13.) Such loan was 
guaranteed by Defendant Richard A. Christenson (Recitals Page 1, 
paragraph C and Exhibit D of Defendants Exhibit 3). 
7. Defendants Overthrust and Faust Land received none of 
the proceeds of this fourth loan or any of the loans. (Testimony 
Richard Christenson, R-481, Page 225 and Exhibit D-13.) 
8. The $1,000,000 loan (the fourth loan) was subsequently 
exclusively secured by the following: 
9 
a) A Promissory Note receivable, issued and signed by 
First Security Financial December 10, 1982, in the unpaid amount 
of $1,007,777.42, including interest, payable to Richard A. 
Christenson and Bruce Moser. (Parts A and B of Defendants 
Exhibit 5; Defendants Exhibits 6.) This receivable was assigned 
to Zions as security on December 28, 1984 (Exhibit D of Defen-
dants Exhibit 5). 
b) Later added as security on May 20, 1986 were 538 
acres in Section 3 5 of Summit County in the name of Bertagnole 
Investment Co. (No. 6 of Defendants Exhibit 3). This 538 acres 
was co-mingled with other land and sold as North Park property 
for $5,000,000 on February 7, 1988 (Parts A and B of Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 10.) 
c) On May 20, 1986 a Trust Deed on the Tooele Prop-
erty, 3,500 acres describing undeveloped land in the name of 
Overthrust was given as security (No. 7 of Defendants Exhibit 3; 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 2). This is the Trust Deed which Plaintiffs 
seek to foreclose in this lawsuit. No additional consideration 
was given to obtain this Trust Deed from Overthrust (D-3). 
9. At the time the Tooele Property was pledged by Trust 
Deed to secure the $1,000,000 Note on May 20, 1986, the Bertag-
noles held no interest in Capitol Thrift and Loan. (Exhibit 
D-5; Exhibit D-3.) Richard A. Christenson signed as President of 
Capitol (D-3). 
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10. Richard A. Christenson controlled Capitol Thrift & Loan 
and allowed the $1,000,000 Note to go into default (Defendants 
Exhibit 5; and Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint (R-198.) 
11. 4447 Associates, a Utah Partnership, acquired a parti-
cipation interest in and to Plaintiff Zions First National Bank's 
interest to the second, third, and fourth Promissory Notes. 
(Defendants Exhibit 4, Page 4, paragraph 1; also Amended 
Complaint R-197.) 
12. Subsequent to the execution of the above-described 
Trust Deed, Defendant Overthrust conveyed title to the Tooele 
Property to Defendant Faust Land, Inc. (Plaintiffs Complaint). 
Defendant Faust is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant 
Overthrust (Defendants Answer to Third Amended Complaint, R-
208.) 
13. Subsequent to the default on the Notes, Plaintiffs 
Zions and 4447 Associates engaged in negotiations with the 
obligors on such Notes (Exhibit D-4)• 
14. Defendants Overthrust Oil and Gas Corporation and Faust 
Land, Inc., were not obligors on such Notes. Overthrust and 
Faust did not sign the Notes and had no obligation of payment 
thereon. (Exhibit P-l.) 
15. On September 30, 1987, following the settlement 
negotiations, the Plaintiffs and the obligors under all of the 
Promissory Notes executed a Settlement Agreement (Exhibit D-4). 
Such Agreement was executed between the Plaintiffs, Bertagnole 
Investment Company Limited Partnership, Bertagnole Properties, 
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several individuals from the Bertagnole family, Emanuel A. Floor, 
and Richard A. Christenson. (Exhibit D-4, Page 1, paragraph 1 
and Page 17, paragraph 18.) (Also see entire Exhibit D-4.) 
16. The Settlement Agreement contemplated the foreclosure, 
or conveyance in lieu thereof, of various parcels of property 
securing the three Notes, as well as the payment of certain 
"boot" by the obligors under such Notes, all in exchange for a 
contemplated release from liability of the obligors on such 
Notes. (Exhibit D-4, Page 15, paragraph 8c through Page 16, 
paragraph 9.) 
17. Defendants, Overthrust Oil & Gas and Faust Land were 
not a party to said Settlement Agreement. (Exhibit D-4, Page 10, 
paragraph 4, sentence 2; Page 4, paragraph la(l).) 
18. Said Agreement provides: 
(a) "That the fee ownership of such property [the 
Tooele Property] is presently vested in the name of Overthrust 
Oil & Gas Co." (Exhibit D-4, Page 4, paragraph l.a(a).) 
(b) The Agreement states that Overthrust is not a 
party to the Agreement: "It is acknowledged that some or all of 
the . . . rights to be transferred to Lenders are owned by 
Overthrust or other third parties which are not parties to this 
Agreement." (Exhibit D-4, Page 10, paragraph 4, sentence 2.) 
(Also Page 14, paragraph 8(b).) 
(c) The First Security Note receivables securing the 
Note was "unconditionally assigned to Zions." (A completed and 
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irreversible transaction.) (Exhibit D-4, Page 12, paragraph 6, 
sentence 1.) 
On September 30, 1987, the Promissory Note ceased to be 
security and title was transferred to Zions Bank, without any 
consideration to Defendants Overthrust or Faust Land, Inc. 
(Defendants Exhibit 4, Page 12, paragraph 6 . . . have been 
"unconditionally assigned to Zions.") 
Pursuant to this assignment Plaintiffs Zions and 4447 
Associates initiated legal action to collect said First Security 
Financial Note in Third District Court, Case No. C-1978, Zions 
vs. First Security. That case had not been concluded at the time 
of the trial of this case (D-5). 
(d) The Agreement provides that "in the €ivent any 
requirement of this Agreement cannot be achieved, and is not 
waived by both of the Lenders, the entire Agreement shall be null 
and void. . ." (Exhibit D-4, Page 14, paragraph 8(c), last 
sentence at bottom of page), and the Court ruled that Plaintiffs 
were estopped from setting aside the September 30, 1987 Agreement 
because almost two years have passed and Plaintiffs have elected 
to treat the agreement as valid (Conclusions of Law No. 3). 
(e) The Agreement provides that the maker and 
guarantor of the $1,000,000 Note, Capitol Thrift and Loan and 
Richard A. Christenson, "shall be mutually released . . . " 
(Exhibit D-4, Page 10, paragraph 9). 
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(f) The Agreement provides that the sole remedy for 
non-performance shall be to declare the Agreement void. (Exhibit 
D-4, Page 15, top of page.) 
(g) The Agreement of September 30, 1987 provides for a 
mutual release of all parties "to release each other from further 
liability." (Exhibit 4, Page 4.) 
(h) By the Agreement the Kimball property was to be 
conveyed to Zions. The Kimball property belonged to Kimball 
Associates who was not a party to the Agreement (Exhibit D-4, 
pages 4 and 5). 
(i) By the Agreement the North Park Property was 5368 
acres. However, 5000 acres had been pledged on Note No. 2 and 
368 acres as security on the Note upon which this foreclosure is 
based. The Agreement merges and dissolves the distinction 
between the properties and disposes of these properties jointly 
(Exhibit D-4). 
(j) The Agreement also included Deer Hollow property 
which was not pledged as security on any Note (Exhibit D-4). 
(k) The Agreement further provided for receipt by 
Zions of lease assignments (Exhibit 4, Page 7 and 9) and mineral 
rights (Exhibit 4, Page 10). 
(1) The Agreement provided that 10,000,000 shares of 
Overthrust stock be conveyed to Zions. 
(m) The Agreement describes real property not pledged 
on any Note (D-4, la, Page 4, Exhibit D-4). The real property 
was described as follows: 
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(1) Tooele County Property (subject of this 
lawsuit)* (Security for Note 4.) 
(2) Kimball Property (did not secure any note). 
(3) North Park Property - 5368 acres - 5000 acres 
Note 2 and 340 acres secured Note 4. 
(4) Redwood Road Property (did not secure any 
Note). 
(5) Deer Hollow Property (did not secure any 
Note). 
(n) The Agreement refers to "miscellaneous" which 
include: 
(1) Mineral rights to North Park and Tooele 
Properties. 
(2) Water rights, 
(3) Oil and gas leases. 
(o) The Agreement required the assignment of the First 
Security Financial note, principal and interest in the amount of 
$1,007,777.00 to Zions-4447 with an agreed upon no credit to 
borrowers "unconditionally assigned without credit to any Note 
(D-4, page 12). 
(p) The Agreement called for the Defendants, Bertag-
nole Investment Company and Bertagnole Properties, to transfer to 
the Plaintiffs and/or allow the foreclosure of certain real and 
personal properties which were the security for the settled 
loans. Said Defendants did transfer to Plaintiffs and did allow 
the foreclosure of the assets as called for in the Agreement in 
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the following paragraphs of the Agreement« (Exhibit D-4, page 4, 
Definitions (a), (2), (3), (4)(a), (4)(b), (5)(b), (1), (2), (3). 
19. The properties accepted by Zions-4447 either by 
foreclosure sale or by conveyance secured the loans indicated and 
had these values as follows as found by the Court: 
(a) North Park Property - The North Park Property was 
pledged on the No. 2 loan. However, in the Agreement (Exhibit 
4), Section 35 was included in the North Park description and 
both properties were sold for $5,000,000 at the sale—even though 
Section 35 was specifically pledged to Note 4. The sale was made 
at $5,000,000, allocated to Notes 2 and 3. 
(b) Redwood Road Property - The Redwood Road Property 
was sold at a price of $155,000, allocated to Notes 2 and 3. 
Other properties, i.e., Deer Hollow Property and Kim-
ball Property, were conveyed without sale as "boot." Zions-4447 
allocated all credit from these properties to Notes 2 and 3. 
20. Leases and lease payments were assigned under the 
contract. All credit was assigned to Notes 1 and 2. 
21. Mineral rights having a value of $451,000 were trans-
ferred by Overthrust to Zions-4447. This credit, also, was given 
to Notes 1 and 2. 
22. Ten million shares of stock of Overthrust were trans-
ferred to Zions-4447. Credit for this transfer was given to 
Notes 1 and 2. 
23. The First Security Financial litigation was assigned to 
Zions and no credit given to any note and the parties agreed that 
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even if Zions should collect said Note in full, that no credit 
would be given to any Note (D-4, Page 12). 
The First Security Financial receivable, however, secured 
Note 3 and its benefits were all contracted away by all parties 
with no benefit to the Note on which Overthrustfs land was 
pledged (see D-3, Pre-Loan Agreement). Zions-4447 converted the 
receivable and initiated a legal action on the same (Exhibit 5). 
24. George Woodhead did not agree and could not agree to 
allow foreclosure or to make a conveyance because as President of 
Overthrust he had no authority to bind Overthrust and liability 
to himself would be created if he exceeded his authority and 
minority shareholder rights would not be protected. (Testimony 
George S. Woodhead.) (R-481, Page 175; also see Findings of Fact 
No. 19, Conclusion No. 5.) 
25. The Court found the amount owing on the $1,000,000.00 
loan referenced in paragraph 5 above, as of August 31, 1989, but 
without the allocation of any previously received amounts or 
allocation of the corresponding reduction of interest, was the 
sum of $1,461,226.70 (Testimony Allen J. Potts, Zions). The 
amount due on all loans was $7,380,000 (R-481, Pages 14 and 44). 
26. This amount was owed by Capitol Thrift and Loan and 
Richard A. Christenson. (Exhibit D-3, Extension Agreement; 
Exhibit P-l; Exhibit D-13, Christenson Letter; Exhibit D-12, 
Stock Purchase Agreement; Exhibit D-ll, 1st Promissory Note on 
which Christenson borrowed monies.) 
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27. The proportionate pro rata share to be applied to the 
loans was determined by the Court to be as follows: 
$1,000,000.00 loan plus interest to 
Trial Date September 30, 1989 . . . . . $1,461,000.00 
Total Loans . . . . . . . . . $7,380,000.00 
1,461,000.00 = 19.79% 
7,380,000.00 
(Conclusions of Law No. 13; also Testimony of Al Potts, Zions, 
R-481, Pages 14 and 44.) 
Thus the Court found that the proportionate amount to be 
credited against the loan for boot and sale of co-mingled North 
Park Property is 19.79% of each credit. (Memorandum Decision; 
P.4, line 25 to P.5, line 4.) 
Summit County Water 
and Oil Rights 
Deer Hollow Property 
Redwood Road Property 
Overthrust Stock 
Value of Shirley 
Thorpe Trust Deed 
Section 35 
Balance Owing on Note 3 
(Typographical error of 
A 
Total Value 
$450,000 
$200,000 
$150,000 
$250,000 
$1,055,000 
$300.00) 
B 
19.9% of 
$208,784. 
$ 21,200. 
$ 79,200. 
$1,152,115. 
300. 
_A 
.50 
.00 
.00 
,50 
.00 
$1,151,815.50 
This amount is $300.00 less than Judgment (because of 
mathematical error). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT I. 
Overthrust believes that the Agreement of September 30, 1987 
was dispositive of this case and that the case should have been 
dismissed as settled by the terms of that Agreement. 
ARGUMENT II. 
Overthrust was entitled to a determination of debt; how-
ever, Capitol and Christenson had paid extra consideration for 
a release and that consideration should have been credited to 
the Overthrust Note and it was not, Overthrust was entitled to 
receive credit against the Note and to have other pledged 
security sold and the credits therefrom applied to the debt 
prior to the foreclosure of its real property. 
ARGUMENT III 
The release by the Agreement of the September 30, 1987 of 
Christenson and Capitol operated as a release of Overthrust. 
ARGUMENT IV 
Under the Agreement of September 30, 1987, certain transfers 
were made to Zions-4447. When credits based on the Courts 
Findings were totaled, they were found to be in excess of the 
total debt. 
ARGUMENT V 
The Agreement of September 30, 198 provided for a transfer 
of 10,000,0000 shares of Overthrust to Zions-4447. A right of 
redemption was given for 10 cents a share which fixed the value 
of $1,000,000. Zions-4447 should be estopped from claiming a 
lesser value. 
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ARGUMENT VI 
There was absolutely no testimony that Bertagnole Family 
held substantial interest in Capitol Thrift and Loan. 
ARGUMENT VII 
An act of Overthrust could not be a failure of consideration 
because Overthrust was not a party to the Agreement. 
ARGUMENT VIII 
There was ample evidence to sustain the fact that Overthrust 
was an accommodation guarantor (with its Trust Deed). There was 
no evidence to the contrary. 
ARGUMENT IX 
The Agreement of September 30, 1987 was a Novation. It 
substituted agreements for the Notes, security and obligations. 
These agreements affected Overthrust1s properties by which 
Overthrust should be Oreleased. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF THE 
AGREEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1987, WHICH HAD DISPOSED OF 
ALL ISSUES IN THIS CASE. 
The parties in late summer and early fall of 1987 negotiated 
an Agreement (D-4). The Agreement preliminarily took the form of 
a petition to the Bankruptcy Court where a Bankruptcy Court Order 
was entered consistent with section 3 63 sale as provided by the 
Bankruptcy Act (see page 8 of Exhibit D-4 and various other 
references contained therein). 
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The Agreement names the parties thereto (Page 1, D-4) 
significantly, the name of Overthrust does not appear. The 
testimony was that Overthrust joined in negotiations but did not 
become a party (R-431, Findings 17 and 19). Overthrust is also 
specifically referred to as not being a party on Page 10 
paragraph 4 of D-4 which states: 
It is acknowledged that some or all of the mineral 
rights and the water rights to be transferred to 
the Lenders are owned by Overthrust . . . 
The property subject to this action is described on page 4, 
paragraph 1(a) of the Agreement, which states: 
Fee ownership of such property is presently vested 
in the name of Overthrust Oil and Gas Corporation. 
Where the Agreement refers to Deer Hollow Property, it also 
states that said property is "not vested" in the name of Richard 
Christenson; it also adds "but can be obtained by Christenson to 
fulfill the terms of this Agreement." A like statement is Not 
made with respect to Overthrust in paragraph 4 of D-4. By the 
Agreement it is obvious that all parties knew that Overthrust was 
not a party to the Agreement (D-4). 
Under paragraph 2, the Agreement provides for a sale of 
North Park Property. This occurred including the 538 acres 
specifically pledged on the $1,000,000 Note to which Overthrust 
land was pledged as security. In this paragraph the signators 
completely ignored the rights of Overthrust to have that property 
separately sold and funds applied to the $1,000,000 debt prior to 
the sale of the Overthrust land. 
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Under paragraph 6 the borrowers unconditionally assign to 
Zions-4447 the First Security Financial Note principal and 
interest of $1,007,777. In making this assignment, the borrowers 
were being very generous with the receivable which should have 
protected Overthrustfs property. By this Agreement, Zions Bank 
took title outright to the receivable and openly arrogantly 
stated on page 13 of D-4 that No Credit will be given to 
borrowers and none to Overthrust for any collection• 
The treatment of the 538 acres of the North Park property 
and the absolute conveyance of the First Security Financial 
obligation to Zions-4447 and the sale of the 538 acres merged 
with the North Park properties as well as process of initiating 
an action on the First Security Financial Note constitutes a 
conversion of security and Zions-4447 are estopped from alleging 
that the debt is not paid in full. 
The contractual obligations of the borrowers (this does not 
include Overthrust) are set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the 
September 30, 1987 Agreement. 
Borrowers have complied with all these obligations pursuant 
to said contract of September 30, 1987. 
Paragraph 9 of the Settlement Agreement of September 30, 
1987 provides a general (not just deficiency) release to 
Guarantor Christenson and Capitol Thrift and Loan (maker of the 
$1,000,000 Note) from any obligation, and interestingly enough a 
series of entities controlled by Christenson (Cape Trust, 
Franklin Financial). 
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Paragraph 8(b) provides that the Agreement is subject to 
"cooperation and performance." In 8(c) the Agreement states that 
if any term cannot be achieved and is not waived, then "the 
entire Agreement shall be thereafter null and void at option of 
Zions or 4447. 
The Agreement was dated September 30, 1987, and no notice of 
rescission has been given in over 23 months at time of trial from 
date of the Agreement. It follows that there has been a waiver 
of the condition of conveyance in lieu of foreclosure. Other-
wise, all parties would now have received a notice of rescission 
and restoration of other considerations granted in the Agreement. 
It is now legally too late to void the contract. Failure to act 
on an existing right constitutes a waiver of that right. 
Paragraph 8(c) states that all documents accomplishing the 
intent of this Agreement shall be held in escrow. This has not 
happened. Titles to the properties have been rendered. Specifi-
cally, Section 35 Deed and North Park Deed have been recorded in 
the name of Zions First National Bank, and a legal action has 
been initiated to collect the $1,007,777 Note from First Security 
Bank. The Agreement is in full force and effect. 
While Overthrust has not become a party to the Agreement, 
the Agreement has irremediably disposed of properties which 
Overthrust was entitled to have disposed of under the one action 
rule prior to the foreclosure sale of its property. Section 35 
was disposed of by a global sale, together with the North Park 
Property. Also, the First Security Financial Note was "given" 
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to Zions-4447 who have initiated a legal action on the same. 
Overthrust was entitled also to have this item sold in the open 
market sale prior to foreclosure of its properties. 
Zions-4447 did not ask for rescission of the September 30, 
1987 Agreement (D-4) nor did they ask for reformation (see Third 
Amended Complaint). 
This action in effect constitutes an effort by Zions-4447 to 
retain everything obtained by the Agreement (including summary 
disposition of security which should have protected Overthrustfs 
position and the granting of releases to the maker (Capitol) and 
guarantor (Christenson), but to obtain the Overthrust property 
when it is precisely these Plaintiffs who have disposed of the 
security which should first have been sold and credited to 
Overthrust. Only after the sale of the previous security could 
the Overthrust property be sold in foreclosure. 
In addition, the Agreement released Capitol as maker and 
Christenson as guarantor. A release of primary obligors consti-
tutes a release of security. 
The Plaintiffs have taken advantage of the Agreement to the 
detriment of Overthrust and they have not followed procedures for 
setting the Agreement aside. Said procedures are a condition 
precedent to bringing an action to foreclose. 
Zions-4447 received approximately $8,000,000 worth of prop-
erty, partly in sales and partly just by conveyance as "boot." 
Zions-4447 ought not to obtain benefits from the Agreement and 
not honor the Agreement. 
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A party cannot avail itself of benefits under a contract on 
the one hand but avoid burdens of that same contract on the other 
hand. Blumfield Agency v. Little Belt, Inc., 663 P.2d 1164 
Montana (1983). Specifically, the Court stated: "A party cannot 
avail himself of benefits of contract but avoid burdens of that 
contract on the other hand. In Triste v. Industrial Commission. 
544 P.2d 706, 25 Ariz. App. 489 (1976) the Court said, "There is 
no suggestion that the petitioner or anyone else with an interest 
in this matter wishes to undo the settlement which was made and 
upon which payments have already been paid . .
 e Under ordinary 
principles of estoppel, a party to a settlement is not entitled 
to keep the benefits of it while renouncing the burdens. 
The burden in this Agreement is that of rescission in the 
event of non-performance by any party expected to perform, even 
though not a party to the Agreement. This was contemplated by 
the parties. (D-4, Page 8). 
Although the Trial Court tried to unravel the Gordian Knot, 
it did not, and indeed, cannot do so. The Agreement and all 
proviions should stand. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE CASE FOR 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE ONE ACTION RULE. U.C.A. 78-37-1 
AND PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM PROCEEDING WITH THE 
FORECLOSURE ACTION AFTER HAVING DISPOSED OF OVERTHRUST'S 
PRIOR SECURITY. 
The Agreement of September 30, 1987 provided for only one 
remedy. That remedy was rescission. That has not been requested 
and indeed the Court held that the Agreement is binding. 
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(Memorandum Opinion.) 
In that Agreement, Zions-4447 converted and disposed of the 
First Security Financial Note ($1,007,777) amd 538 acres sold 
along with the North Park property. The 538 acres and the First 
Security Financial Note were specifically pledged on this Note 
and none other. 
The Court erred in trying to unravel these premature 
actions. The Court even did this in inconsistent fashion by 
placing a value on the 538 acres of Section 35 and refused to 
give any value to the First Security Financial receivable. (See 
Memorandum Decision.) 
Overthrust believes both rulings to be in error. The prop-
erties and the Note should have been sold at the foreclosure 
sale, together with or prior to the Trust Deed property: 
There can be one action for the recovery of any 
debt or the enforcement of any right secured 
solely by mortgage upon real estate, which action 
must be in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter. Judgment shall be given adjudging the 
amount due, with costs and disbursements, and the 
sale of mortgage property, or some part thereof, 
to satisfy said amount and accruing costs, and 
directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the same 
according to the provisions of law relating to 
sales on execution, and a special execution order 
of the sale shall be issued for that purpose. 
U.C.A. 78-37-1. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
Foreclosure is statutory; foreclosure proceedings 
on a mortgage securing a note in default must be 
conducted in accordance with the statutes. Stewart 
Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 105 U. 529, 144 P. 2d 276, 
applying R.S. 1933, ss 104-55-1, et seq. 
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This rule requires that a foreclosure of security must be 
joined with the determination of debt. Debt is not a disembodied 
spirit. It must be owed by someone. 
The Agreement (D-4, Page 9) states: 
Upon the transfer and recordation of the documents 
required herein, it is agreed that the Lenders on 
the one hand and the Borrowers, Christenson, Frank-
lin Financial, Capitol Thrift & Loan and the trustees 
of CAPE TRUST, a qualified pension and profit shar-
ing plan, on the other hand, shall be mutually 
released from any and all obligation and liability 
to each other in connection with, or in any way re-
lated to, Loans No. 1, No. 2, No. 3 and No. 4, except 
for any duties, responsibilities and rights set forth 
in this Agreement and documents and instruments exe-
cuted in connection herewith. In such event, Lenders 
specifically acknowledge that Borrowers1 and Chris-
tenson fs personal obligations under such Loans will be 
terminated and Lenders1 sole remedy shall be against 
the real properties which are subject of this 
Agreement. 
The Note was signed by Capitol Thrift and Loan (D-3). The 
failure of Plaintiffs to have joined Capitol in Plaintiff's 
original Complaint is further evidence that Plaintiffs believe 
that they have effectively released Capitol and that Capitol 
could not therefore be joined as a party defendant. If there is 
no debt for the Overthrust Mortgage to secure, the action must be 
dismissed. In the answers to Cross Complaint, Cross Claim Defen-
dant Capitol, as well as Richard A. Christenson, allege that the 
Note upon which this action is based was paid and discharged by 
an Accord and Satisfaction. (R-213, Christenson and Capitol 
Responses to Third Amended Complaint.) 
There was additional security pledged to satisfy this 
obligation (D-3). Overthrust was entitled to have the "other" 
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security (Section 35) and First Security Financial receivable 
applied the debt prior to or concurrent with the foreclosure of 
Overthrust real estate. 
When a Creditor sues for recovery of a single debt secured 
by more than one parcel of real property, the debtor may compel 
the creditor to include all of the security in a single judicial 
foreclosure. Walker v. Community Bank, 518 P.2 329, 111 Cal. 
Rptr 897, 10 C.3rd 729. 
This the Plaintiff cannot do having previously disposed of 
Section 35 and the First Security Financial obligation. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE DEBT WAS PAID 
BY AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WITH THE CONTRACTUAL RELEASE 
OF CAPITOL AND CHRISTENSON. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT ALL NOTES WERE PAID 
IN FULL BY TRANSFERS MADE UNDER THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT OF 
SEPTEMBER 30, 1987. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VALUE OF STOCK GIVEN 
TO ZIONS-4447 WAS $250,000 INSTEAD OF $1,000,000. 
The above three arguments are treated jointly. 
The Agreement of September 30, 1987 contains two paragraphs 
on releases. Paragraph 9 states ". . .Lenders on one hand and 
Borrowers, Christenson, Franklin Financial, Capitol Thrift and 
Loan and the trustees of Cape Trust. . . shall be mutually 
released, shall be released from any and all obligations and 
liability to each other. . ." Also, the introduction on page 4 
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of that Agreement states " . . . and to release each other from 
further liability in connection with said loans." 
The Court found that the Agreement was a binding contract 
and by its terms any remedy for nonperformance is rescission. 
The Court also ruled that the contract could not now be 
rescinded. (See Memorandum Opinion.) 
Assuming arguendo that the contract Agreement (D-4) did not 
dispose of the debt as above argued, the debt is nevertheless 
paid (Point IV) by the transfer of assets as found by the Court. 
The Court made Findings as to values as set forth in the 
Findings of Fact. These values made by the Court are as follows: 
Description of Asset Credit to Total Credit 
Received by Zions Overthrust to Zions-4447 
North Park and Section 35 $79,500.00 $5,000,000.00 
(R-427) 
Shirley Thorpe Release of 21,200.00 21,200.00 
Trust Deed Note on Sec. 35 
Redwood Road Property Front 30,675.00 155,000.00 
10 acres (R-426) 
Redwood Road Rear Utility -0- 620,000.00 
Access 
Kimball Associates Note -0- 350,000.00 
Deer Hollow Property (R-426) 39,580.00 200,000,00 
Mineral Rights (R-426) 89,055.00 450,000.00 
Overthrust Stock (R-426) 49,470.00 250,000.00 
Reverse of Interest Charges -0- 1,422,291.00 
from Sept. 30, 1970 to Date 
of Trial (R-481, Page 34) 
TOTAL PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY ZIONS-4447 
PURSUANT TO THEIR AGREEMENT (D-4) $8,468,491.00 
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TOTAL DUE ON ALL NOTES ON DATE OF TRIAL 7,380,000,00 
THIS CONSTITUTES ON OVERPAYMENT ON ALL 
NOTES BY THE AMOUNT OF - $1,088.491.00 
In actuality, the true amount for which credit should be 
given on overcharged interest is approximately $200,000.00 more 
than above stated because the figure used to back off interest to 
September 30, 1987 was ten percent (10%) when the interest rate 
on the Notes is one (1) point above B-2 (R-481, Page 34) . (Also 
see Exhibit D-3.) 
In addition, the Court found the stock value to be $250,000, 
when Exhibit D-4 placed a value of $1,000,000 on the stock. 
Parole evidence should not be allowed to defeat the Agreement. 
POINT V is perhaps moot because the amount paid by trans-
fers to Zions-4447 under Exhibit D-4 is in excess of the debt. 
However, if the agreed upon value of the stock is accepted (D-4, 
Pages 10-11, paragraph 4), the value of transfers on the Notes 
would be $750,000 greater than that indicated or $9,218,491. 
The Agreement (D-4) was drafted by Zions-4447 counsel. That 
Agreement has globally lumped and averaged the assets and the 
liabilities. This was evidently exactly that which Zions-4447 
wanted to do. If there is any ambiguity in the document, it must 
be interpreted in favor of an Overthrust interpretation. Zions-
4447 should be estopped from asking for any relief not consistent 
with that Agreement. 
In analyzing these assets we have taken the value as found 
by the court. The portion not allocated on the $1,000,000 Note 
must be credited to the indebtedness as a whole. We cannot pick 
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up one end of the stick without picking up the other. It is 
mathematically clear that all debts on all Notes were paid in 
full by the Agreement of September 30, 1987. This was largely 
established by testimony of Zions-4447 own witness (Al Potts, 
R-41). 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT BERTAGNOLE PARTNERSHIP AND 
MEMBERS OF THE BERTAGNOLE FAMILY HELD SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST 
IN CAPITOL THRIFT AND LOAN (Finding No. 7). 
The only testimony dealing with this point is that given by 
George Woodhead when he testified that Bertagnoles did not con-
trol Capitol (R-481, Page 158) . 
The alleged Finding No. 7 is in error to the extent it 
influenced the Finding by the Court that the pledge by Overthrust 
was not an accommodation. To that extent it was prejudicial to 
Overthrust (Finding No. 13f R-432). The Court found that even 
though Bertagnole had an interest in Capitol and Overthrust, they 
were two separate entities. (Memorandum Decision.) There was no 
testimony supporting Finding No. 7. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 2 WHICH STATED 
"FAILURE OF THE PLAINTIFFS TO BE ALLOWED TO FORECLOSE 
AGAINST THE TOOELE PROPERTY...WOULD HAVE CONSTITUTED A 
FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION." (Conclusion of Law No.2,R-427) 
The above Conclusion of Law is in conflict with the Findings 
of the Court that Overthrust is not a party to the Agreement 
(Finding No. 13, R-432). Further, the parties entered into the 
Agreement with full knowledge that Overthrust was not a parti-
cipant (see Exhibit D-4, Pages 1, 4 and 10). 
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The Court also found that the Plaintiffs Zions-4447 are 
estopped from setting the Settlement Agreement aside. It is a 
valid agreement. Zions-4447 entered into the Agreement with full 
knowledge that Overthrust was not a participant (see Exhibit D-
Pages 1, 4 and 10). 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT OVERTHRUST WAS NOT AN 
ACCOMMODATION GUARANTOR WITH RESPECT TO THE PLEDGE OF 
REAL PROPERTY. THE COURT FURTHER ERRED IN NOT FINDING 
THE ACCOMMODATION SECURITY DISCHARGED BY THE DISCHARGE 
OF THE PRINCIPALS. 
Overthrust believes it to be entitled to the benefits of 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 70A-3-606 (1986). This statute 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(1) The holder discharges any part to the instru-
ment to the extent that without such party's consent the 
holder . . . 
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the 
instrument given by or on behalf of the party or any 
person against whom he has a right of recourse. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in interpreting this section, 
stated that: 
[a] division of authority exists concerning the scope of 
the reference to "any party" in subsection 3-606(1)(foot-
note omitted). We believe that the defense of discharge 
found in that provision is properly characterized as surety-
ship defense" (footnote omitted). Thus, it would appear 
that subsection 3-606(1), while including accommodation 
parties and other parties to an instrument in the position 
of sureties, does not apply to makers binding themselves 
only as principals. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Watts, 
737 P.2d 154, 160 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added). 
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Thus, while accommodation parties have defenses available 
under section 70A-3-606, principal makers do not* 
The Court goes on to state that whether or not a signor does 
so as an accommodation is a question of intent. The Court sets 
out three criterion: 
(1) Whether signer receives a benefit directly or 
indirectly; 
(2) Whether the signature was necessary to receive 
the consideration; 
(3) Whether the party claiming accommodation . . .??? 
Moonev v. GR and Associates, 746 P.2d 1174 (Utah Ct. of 
Appeals). See also Utah Farm Production Credit Association 
v. Watts, 737 P.2d 154, (Supreme Court). 
In this case the facts are clear in the documents: 
Page 3 of the Agreement between borrowing parties. 
(Paragraph I of Loan Agreement, D-3.) 
Wherein, Zions affirms it willingness to grant an 
extension . . . certain real property in Tooele County . . . 
(D-3, Page 3, Document 1 
Further, Christenson testified that he and his affili-
ates had drawn down the line of credit by $870,000. (Exhibit D-
13, Christenson Letter, Exhibit D-ll, First Promissory Note on 
which Christenson borrowed money.) 
This pledge by Overthrust was not to secure its own 
debt in any particular. Indeed, the debt guaranteed by 
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Overthrust was contracted in 1981. Overthrustfs generally was 
1986. 
Overthrust was clearly accommodation guarantor with its 
security. 
It therefore follows that Overthrust is entitled to the 
benefit of 70A-3-606. Zions-4447 ought to be estopped from 
proceeding on this foreclosure action. 
The issues between the maker (Capitol) and guarantor 
(Christenson) of the $1,000,000 Promissory Note on the one hand 
and Plaintiffs on the other hand were settled by an Accord and 
Satisfaction. 
Paragraph 9 of the Settlement Agreement of September 30, 
1987 reads as follows: 
"9. General Release. Upon the transfer and 
recordation of the documents required herein, it is 
agreed that Lenders on the one hand, and Borrowers 
Christenson, Franklin Financial, Capitol Thrift and 
Loan and the trustees of CAPE TRUST, a qualified 
pension and profit sharing plan, on the other hand, 
shall be mutually released from any and all obliga-
tion and liability to each other in connection with, 
or in any way related to Loans #1, #2, #3, and #4, 
except in this Agreement and documents and instruments 
executed in connection herewith. In such an event, 
Lenders specifically acknowledge the Borrowers1 and 
Christenson's personal obligations under such loans 
will be terminated and Lender's sole remedy shall be 
against the real properties which are subject to this 
Agreement." 
Where there is no debt, there is no claim on the security. 
McAllister v. Farmers Development Co., 143 P.2d 537, 47 N.M. 395. 
Foreclosure of a trust deed (mortgage) cannot be ordered 
until the amount of the indebtedness sued upon and so secured 
by the mortgage is determined. 
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55 Am. Jur. 2d P. 437, Section 394 states: (see 
action Section 34 ALR 980): 
The general rule is that payment of the secured 
debt ipso facto eo instanti extinguishes the lien 
of the mortgage or deed of trust for the benefit 
of whoever is the owner at the time of payment. 
Indeed, on the ground that the incident cannot sur-
vive the principal, it is said that anything that 
operates to extinguish the debt necessarily oper-
ates to discharge the mortgage. See also Am. Jur., 
2d Section 132. 
The dominant feature of a real estate mortgage is 
generally regarded as that of security for the debt, 
to which it is collateral, appurtenant or an acces-
sory, and on which it is dependent. In other words, 
the debt secured by a mortgage is regarded as the 
primary obligation between the parties, and the 
mortgage as incidental to the indebtedness or obli-
gation thereby. 
In Grieve v. Huber, Supreme Court of Wyoming, 283 P. 1105, 
285 Wy 788, the Court said; 
Of course in order that a judgment directing the sale 
of the property be valid, a debt or account on which 
it is directed to be made must exist, and none should 
be ordered unless that fact is certain. 
The existence of the September 30, 1987 Settlement Agreement 
provides that there is no debt. The action should therefore be 
dismissed. 
POINT IX 
THE MODIFICATIONS SET FORTH IN PART III ABOVE CONSTITUTES 
A NOVATION OR A SUBSTITUTE CONTRACT. THAT NOVATION COM-
PROMISES THE RIGHTS OF OVERTHRUST. 
The Agreement of September 30, 1987 draws a new accord 
between the Borrowers and Lenders. The parties did not make 
Overthrust a party to that Agreement. This was not an over-
sight. Overthrust refused to be a party. The contract makes 
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reference to the Overthrust position, but Overthrust is not a 
party to the Agreement. Existing security was disposed of in the 
Agreement and additional consideration was accepted, 
"For a substitute contract to be effective it must be 
supported by consideration* Sufficient consideration exists 
where there is reciprocity." Herman v. Gordon et al. Utah 1987 
Court of Appeals, 740 P.2d 1346; also U.C.A. 15-4-4 and 15-4-5 
provide that a release of a co-obligor is a release of the 
obligor and the surety. 
In this process the Plaintiffs have destroyed the subroga-
tion rights of Overthrust by which Overthrust is entitled to be 
relieved from the claims of the Plaintiff. 
In M.C.I.C. Financial Corp. vs. H.A. Briggs. Wash. Appeals, 
600 P.2 573 Court of Appeals, the Court stated: 
Courts must protect subrogation rights of junior 
interest holders against prejudicial acts by 
senior interest holders. 
Subrogation is equity extending to parties who, 
although not personally bound to pay debt, are 
compelled o do so in order to protect their 
property interest, and subrogation entitles 
party paying debt to all rights, priorities, 
liens and securities which senior mortgage had 
against mortgagor. Where mortgagor sold mort-
gaged property by warranty deed, such subsequent 
purchasers had right to pay off deed of trust 
note and be subrogated to whatever right senior 
lienor had against mortgagor, including right to 
seek personal judgment against mortgagor, and 
where senior lienor with notice of interest of 
subsequent purchasers released mortgagor and 
guarantor from personal liability, to which re-
lease the purchasers did not consent, there was 
sufficient prejudice to equitable rights or 
purchasers to discharge lien against their prop-
erty. 
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Where mortgagor sold mortgaged property and 
senior lienor with notice of interest in pur-
chaser released mortgagor and guarantor from 
personal liability, fact that purchasers would 
have been subrogated to nothing more than du-
bious right to seek personal judgment against 
bankrupt. Mortgagor did not preclude equity 
from requiring that purchasers be released from 
burden of having to forfeit their land to satisfy 
debt for which principal judgment against bankrupt. 
The Courts have held release of principal without 
release of surety generally releases surety. Also 
see U.C.A. 70 A-3-606 (Uniform Commercial Code). 
CONCLUSION 
The granting of a Decree of Foreclosure was in error; was 
contrary to law; provided for unjust enrichment; and causes 
Overthrust to pay a debt which (1) does note exist and (2) has 
been more than paid. 
The case should be reversed with instructions to the Trial 
Court to find the extent of damages suffered by Overthrust for 
loss of mineral reights and its Tooele property and for entry of 
a Judgment in that amount against Ziokns-4447, as well as against 
Capitol and Christenson. In the alternative, if Overthrustfs 
Tooele Property has not been disposed of, it should be ordered 
returned to Overthrust. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LORIN N. PACE 
Attorney for Appellants 
OVERTHRUST-FAUST 
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